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NOTE
THE NEWSWORTHINESS REQUIREMENT OF THE
PRIVILEGE OF NEUTRAL REPORTAGE IS A
MATTER OF PUBLIC CONCERN
Justin H. Wertman*
INTRODUCTION
The constitutional privilege of neutral reportage protects media de-
fendants from liability for defamation for publishing neutral and accu-
rate accounts of newsworthy charges made by responsible and
prominent organizations against public figures.' The privilege is an
exception to the common law rule that one who repeats defamatory
statements of another is liable for defamation. The basis for the privi-
lege is that, in the case of some statements, it is essential to public
debate on important controversies that the public be aware that the
statements were made, regardless of the possibility that the statements
themselves are false. Thus, although the original defamers may be lia-
ble for defamation, the media is afforded protection to inform the
public of these statements, without fear of liability for defamation
should the statements prove to be false.
Because of the strong public interest in protecting reputations
through defamation law, the privilege applies only in circumstances
where the speech is of high First Amendment value. The elements of
the privilege seek to ensure this. First, the media must report the
charges neutrally and accurately.' Second, the charges must have
been made by a responsible and prominent speaker.3 Third, the sub-
jects of the accusations must be public figures.4 Finally, the charges
must be newsworthy.5
The first requirement, that the report must be neutral and accurate,
ensures that the Constitution will not protect the media's veiled at-
tempts at launching its own defamatory attacks under the guise of in-
forming the public of important controversies. The requirement that
the charges be made by a prominent and responsible speaker in-
creases the likelihood that the accusations are true and, if false, at
least limits the privilege to speech that the public has a strong interest
in hearing. Limiting the privilege to accusations against public figures
* This Note is dedicated to my wife, Geula, and the rest of my family for their
patience and support throughout the preparation of this Note.
1. Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1002 (1977).





serves to foster debate on important public issues, as attacks on the
reputations of public figures often involve issues in which the public
has a strong interest. Finally, the requirement that the charges must
be newsworthy also attempts to limit the privilege to charges in the
context of public debate that the public should be informed about,
even if false.
Analysis of this newsworthiness requirement, however, reveals that
it is broader than necessary to achieve that goal. Ultimately, the re-
quirement affords the media a privilege to defame in contexts in
which it should not.
In 1983, the Supreme Court recognized that speech on "matters of
public concern" lies at the heart of the First Amendment.6 Conse-
quently, courts have since afforded such speech constitutional protec-
tion against claims of invasion of privacy' and defamation. 8 The fact
that speech was of public concern has also protected a plaintiff making
a claim of wrongful termination after being terminated for controver-
sial speech in the workplace. Case law indicates, however, that the
category of speech on matters of public concern is narrower than the
category of newsworthiness which is sufficient to trigger the privilege
of neutral reportage. Only by limiting the privilege of neutral report-
age to charges of true public concern will the privilege accurately re-
flect the goals of the First Amendment it seeks to further.
Part I of this Note provides a basis for understanding the privilege
of neutral reportage. The first subpart catalogues basic defamation
law. The subsequent subparts discuss several common law and consti-
tutional defenses and privileges to defamation, and provide the consti-
tutional basis for the privilege of neutral reportage.
Part II provides a comprehensive analysis of the neutral reportage
privilege. Part II begins by discussing Edwards v. National Audubon
Society,10 the Second Circuit case that created the privilege. The first
subpart of part II examines the creation of, and constitutional justifi-
cations for, the privilege. The following subparts discuss various inter-
pretations of the elements of the privilege, concluding that the
elements provided in Edwards, as opposed to those provided by other
cases applying the privilege, best further the aims of the First Amend-
ment which support the privilege. The final subpart discusses several
of the leading cases opposed to the privilege.
Part III argues that the privilege of neutral reportage, and more
specifically the requirement that the privileged speech be newsworthy,
is overbroad in light of the constitutional goals the privilege seeks to
6. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
7. See Lee v. Calhoun, 948 F.2d 1162, 1166 (10th Cir. 1991).
8. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59(1985).
9. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 145.
10. 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
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further and current Supreme Court treatment of different categories
of speech under the First Amendment. Part III also discusses the val-
ued category of speech on matters of public concern, concluding that
it is more limited than mere newsworthiness.
Finally, part IV proposes limiting the privilege of neutral reportage
to cases implicating speech deserving of constitutional protection.
Specifically, part IV urges that the privilege should apply only to
speech on matters of public concern, as the Supreme Court and Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals have defined that category of speech. Part IV
concludes by illustrating how, under the proposed limitation, the privi-
lege would no longer attach in some situations in which it would pres-
ently apply.
I. THE PRIVILEGE OF NEUTRAL REPORTAGE
A comprehensive analysis of the privilege of neutral reportage nec-
essarily entails an understanding of basic defamation law. This part,
therefore, defines defamation, its contours, and some of its common
law and constitutional privileges. This part concludes by providing a
constitutional basis for the privilege of neutral reportage discussed in
greater length in part II.
A. Basic Defamation Law
A defamatory communication is commonly defined as a communi-
cation tending "to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in
the estimation of [his] community or to deter third persons from asso-
ciating or dealing with him."" Although defamatory communications
are usually statements of fact, statements of opinion are actionable as
11. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 (1977) [hereinafter Restatement Sec-
ond]. Another frequently cited definition of defamation is "words which tend to ex-
pose one to public hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule,
aversion, ostracism, degradation, or disgrace, or to induce an evil opinion of one in
the minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive one of their confidence and
friendly intercourse in society." Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, 186 N.E.
217,218 (N.Y. 1933); see e.g., W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law
of Torts 773 & n.17 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser and Keeton] (criticizing the
Kimmerle definition as too narrow); Laurence H. Eldredge, The Law of Defamation
34 & n.14 (1978) (focusing on "right-thinking persons" requirement); Norman L. Ro-
senberg, Protecting the Best Men: An Interpretive History of the Law of Libel 3
(1986) (offering definition as a rough guide to problems of defamation law).
Traditionally, defamation has been separated into the categories of libel and slan-
der. Libel is permanently written, printed, or broadcast statements, and slander is
"transitory" spoken statements. First Indep. Baptist Church v. Southerland, 373 So.
2d 647, 648 (Ala. 1979); Matherson v. Marchello, 100 A.D.2d 233, 239 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1984); Restatement Second, supra §§ 568, 568A. Significant differences exist be-
tween libel and slander regarding various issues such as the necessity of proving spe-
cial damages. Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 533 F. Supp. 353, 361 (E.D. Pa. 1982),
rev'd sub nom. Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, Ltd., 754 F2d 1072 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985); Restatement Second, supra §§ 569-70,575. For
the purposes of this Note and the analysis of neutral reportage, however, this distinc-
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well if they imply "the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as
the basis for the opinion."' 2
To create liability for defamation, the defamatory statement must
be: (1) false; (2) concerning another; (3) not privileged; and (4) con-
veyed to a third party.13 The defamer is liable for the reputational
harm caused by his statement, as well as for any harm resulting from a
third party's authorized or foreseeable repetition of the defamation. 14
The rule against republication dictates that one who repeats, or "re-
publishes," defamation is subject to liability as if he had originally
published it.15 Under this rule, each new publication of the defama-
tion provides another basis for liability.16 Generally, this is true even
if the "republisher" names the original publisher, attributing the state-
ment accordingly.' 7 For example, if X falsely accused Y of theft, Z
would be liable for defamation for stating either that Y stole, or that
X accused Y of stealing.
In a majority of jurisdictions, the degree of fault necessary for re-
covery by private individuals as defamation plaintiffs is at least negli-
gence by the publisher.' 8 Thus, if the defamer reasonably believed a
tion is irrelevant. Thus, the term "defamation" is used throughout, referring to both
libel and slander.
12. Restatement Second, supra note 11, §§ 565-66; see also Cianci v. New Tunes
Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting § 566 of the Restatement Sec-
ond); Mr. Chow v. Ste. Jour Azur S.A., 759 F.2d 219, 225, 226 (2d Cir. 1985) (discuss-
ing the distinction between protected and unprotected opinions); McDowell v.
Paiewonsky, 769 F.2d 942, 946 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing the rule that generally, only
factual assertions are actionable).
13. McDowell, 769 F.2d at 946; Restatement Second, supra note 11, § 558; Robert
D. Sack & Sandra S. Baron, Libel, Slander, and Related Problems § 2.1. (2d ed. 1994).
The recipient of the defamation must also understand the communication to refer to
the plaintiff. Restatement Second, supra note 11, § 564 cnt. a.; see McDowell, 769
F.2d at 946; Church of Scientology v. Flynn, 744 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 1984).
14. Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90, 136 n.56 (D.C.Cir. 1985); Bolduc v. Bailey,
586 F. Supp. 896, 901 (D. Col. 1984); Restatement Second, supra note 11, § 576; Sack
& Baron, supra note 13, at 125-27. The term "authorized" denotes an authorization
by the defamer to the third party to repeat the defamation. If the defamer does not
expressly authorize repetition but under the circumstances may reasonably expect the
third party to repeat the defamation, the repetition is impliedly authorized and the
original defamer is similarly liable for any repetitions. Prosser and Keeton, supra note
11, at 801.
15. Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo, 849 F.2d 876, 878 (4th Cir. 1988); Liberty Lobby, Inc. v.
Dow Jones & Co., 838 F.2d 1287, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Restatement Second, supra
note 11, § 578; Sack & Baron, supra note 13, § 6.
16. Cianci, 639 F.2d at 60-61; Michelson v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 629 F.
Supp. 418, 422 (W.D. Pa. 1986), affid, 808 F.2d 1005 (3d Cir. 1987); Restatement Sec-
ond, supra note 11, § 578 cmt. b.
17. Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 465 A.2d 953, 956 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1983), affd, 486 A.2d 344 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); Restatement
Second, supra note 11, § 578 cmt. b. This rule against republication applies even to
printed repetitions of oral defamations. Restatement Second, supra note 11, § 578
cmt. d.
18. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 370 (1974) (White, J., dissenting);
Restatement Second, supra note 11, § 558.
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statement about a private figure to be true, the defamer would not be
liable for defamation. A public official plaintiff, however, has a
greater burden, as he must prove that the defamer acted with knowl-
edge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth;19 mere negligence by
the defamer regarding the truth of the statement does not afford re-
covery. The Supreme Court has afforded this added protection, the
"actual malice" standard, to publishers of defamation of public
figures, as well as public officials.' In addition to this higher degree
of fault necessary for recovery in cases involving public officials and
public figures, the First Amendment2' requires a higher burden of
proof in such cases as well. Specifically, the plaintiff must prove actual
malice with clear and convincing evidence, rather than the mere pre-
ponderance of evidence required for most other elements of the defa-
mation case. 2
B. Defenses and Privileges
Several defenses and privileges absolve a publisher of defamation
from liability. 3 Some of these defenses are absolute defenses, afford-
ing a defamer complete protection from liability based on his status or
position.2 4 The remainder of the privileges are conditional, protecting
the defamer only when specific conditions are met. 5 Additionally,
some privileges are creations of common law, while others are rooted
in the Constitution.
19. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). The public official
must prove both knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth by the defend-
ant, in addition to the underlying falsity of the statement. Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,776 (1986). These burdens, however, apply only when the
alleged defamation regarded the public official's conduct, fitness, or role in his official
capacity. Restatement Second, supra note 11, § 580A.
20. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967).
21. U.S. Const. amend. I.
22. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991).
23. See, e.g., Rosen v. NLRB, 735 F.2d 564, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (extending an
absolute privilege to publish defamatory statements in judicial opinions); Medico v.
Tune, Inc., 643 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1981) (permitting the media to publish an accurate
account of an official proceeding); Lee v. Paulsen, 539 P.2d 1079, 1080 (Or. 1975) (en
banc) (noting that cases and scholars agree that publishing defamatory statements
consented to by the defamed is absolutely privileged). See generally, Restatement Sec-
ond, supra note 11, §§ 582-612 (enumerating both absolute and conditional defenses
to a charge of defamation).
24. Restatement Second, supra note 11, tit. B at 243; Sack & Baron, supra note 13,
§§ 7.1 - 7.2; Bruce W. Sanford, Libel and Privacy § 10.4.1 (1996 Supp.).
25. Restatement Second, supra note 11, tit. A at 259-60; Sack & Baron, supra note
13, §§ 7.1, 7.3; Sanford, supra note 24, § 10.5.1.
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1. Common Law Defenses and Privileges
Voluntary consent by the defamed is a common law absolute de-
fense, conferring an absolute privilege to the defamer.26 This defense
is an extension of the general social policy against granting recovery to
a plaintiff for conduct to which he has consented.27 The Restatement
(Second) of Torts ("Restatement Second") lists other absolute common
law privileges as well, including privileges for publications by judges
and legislators in performance of their duties and publications be-
tween spouses concerning third parties.28
The privilege of fair comment is a common law conditional privilege
to publish defamatory opinions on matters of public concern.29 The
privilege attaches only if the opinion is that of the publisher, and is not
published solely to harm the defamed.3 °
The privilege of fair report is another conditional privilege, protect-
ing from liability the publisher of an accurate account of an official
action or proceeding.3 ' The parameters of the privilege, however, are
in a constant state of flux. 32 The privilege of fair report permits, at
minimum, the media to publish fair and accurate accounts of "official
proceedings or reports," such as judicial or legislative transcripts, even
though the reports may contain defamatory statements.33 The media
is under no obligation to investigate the truth of any charges made in
the official proceeding before publishing them.3 For fair report anal-
ysis purposes, accuracy is measured by information available in the
26. Lee, 539 P.2d at 1080; Restatement Second, supra note 11, § 583; Sack &
Baron, supra note 13, § 7.2.8; Sanford, supra note 24, § 10.4.6.
27. Prosser and Keeton, supra note 11, § 114.4.
28. Restatement Second, supra note 11, §§ 585, 590, 592; Sanford, supra note 24,
§ 10.4.2.1. "Truth" is often referred to as an absolute privilege to defamation as well.
The Restatement Second, however, omitted what was previously § 582 ("True State-
ments of Fact") from its chapter of defenses, and replaced it in another chapter with
what is now § 581A ("True Statements"). Regardless of how it is categorized, truth
remains an absolute bar to recovery for defamation. Restatement Second, supra note
11, § 581A.
29. Cassidy v. Merin, 582 A.2d 1039, 1044-48 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990);
Restatement Second, supra note 11, § 566 cmnt. a; Sack & Baron, supra note 13, § 4.4;
Sanford, supra note 24, § 5.2.
30. Cianci v. New York Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 66 (2d Cir. 1980); Re-
statement Second, supra note 11, § 566 cmt. a.
31. Rosenberg v. Helinski, 616 A.2d 866, 873 (Md. 1992); Restatement Second,
supra note 11, § 611; Sack & Baron, supra note 13, §§ 6.3.2.2, 7.37; Sanford, supra
note 24, § 10.2. The Restatement Second's view of the privilege of fair report is actu-
ally broader than the definition provided because it also encompasses reports of pub-
lic meetings dealing with matters of public concern. Restatement Second, supra note
11, § 611. This view, however, is that of the minority. See supra notes 47-50 and ac-
companying text.
32. David A. Elder, The Fair Report Privilege 5, 111-13 (1988).
33. Medico v. Tune, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 137 (3d Cir. 1981).
34. Elder, supra note 32, at 5.
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public record, not by what may have actually transpired prior to the
proceeding.35
The two primary rationales advanced in support of the privilege of
fair report provide some insight into privileges to defamation, the im-
portance of the concerns which lead to their creation, and the urgency
to protect the rights at stake. The rationales for the privilege of fair
report are the agency rationale and the supervisory rationale.3 The
agency rationale justifies the privilege of fair report by rooting the
privilege in an individual's common law right to attend judicial pro-
ceedings.3 7 The press acts as an "agent of the public" in gathering and
disseminating the publicly available information, "reporting only that
which others could hear for themselves were they to attend the pro-
ceedings. ' 3 Based on this rationale, the privilege arises out of practi-
cal necessity, as many individuals are often unable to travel great
distances to attend official proceedings in person.3 9 Additionally, spa-
tial limitations in courthouses prevent more than a limited number of
persons from attending proceedings.
The supervisory rationale, on the other hand, roots the privilege of
fair report in the public's "supervisory or oversight responsibilities
over public bodies and officers."40 Publicizing governmental actions
and proceedings through publication provides the public with a means
of monitoring the conduct of elected officials. 4' Additionally, the pos-
sibility of public scrutiny operates to ensure the integrity of govern-
mental officials in performing their governmental duties,42 and
furthers just administration of the law.43
Based on these two rationales, the fair report privilege was limited
initially to publishing accounts of judicial and legislative proceed-
ings.' Gradually, courts have expanded the privilege to include ac-
counts of administrative and executive reports as well.4s But despite
35. 1d
36. Id- at 3; see also Medico, 643 F.2d at 140-43 (discussing primary agency and
supervisory rationales and secondary public interest rationale for privilege of fair
report).
37. Elder, supra note 32, at 3.
38. Hogan v. Herald Co., 446 N.Y.S.2d 836, 841 (App. Div.), aftd, 444 N.E.2d
1002 (N.Y. 1982).
39. Elder, supra note 32, at 3.
40. Hogan, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 841.
41. Elder, supra note 32, at 3. These governmental duties, rather than a public
interest in the controversies between private individuals, support the privilege.
Medico v. Tine, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 141 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137
Mass. 392, 394 (1884)).
42. Elder, supra note 32, at 3.
43. Medico, 643 F.2d at 141.
44. Elder, supra note 32, at 5.
45. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262,270-71
(7th Cir. 1983) (applying the privilege to an account of a public report of the FTC);
Sprecher v. Dow Jones & Co., 88 A.D.2d 550 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (applying the
privilege to a report of an SEC release).
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continuous expansion of the scope of the fair report privilege, each
new privileged category must generally fall under the broader cate-
gory of "official statements or records made or released by a public
agency.
46
The Restatement Second, however, expanded the privilege beyond
even that limitation. 7 Under the Restatement Second's view of the
privilege of fair report, accurately publishing political speeches of
public officials or candidates for public office is also privileged.48 Ad-
ditionally, the Restatement Second and several cases have held, or at
least suggested, that the privilege covers accounts of some non-gov-
ernmental proceedings and meetings if they are of public concern. 9
This view, however, is the minority. 0
Many state legislatures have codified the fair report privilege. 1 In
doing so, a majority of those states have adopted the majority view
and statutorily limited the privilege to accounts of official-as op-
posed to only public-actions, reports, and proceedings. 2
46. Bufalino v. Associated Press, 692 F.2d 266, 272 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1111 (1983).
47. Elder, supra note 32, at 114.
48. See Restatement Second, supra note 11, § 611 cmt. i.
Comment a of § 611 of the Restatement Second also raises the issue of whether the
privilege of fair report is conditional or absolute. While some states have enacted an
absolute privilege of fair report, others have enacted a conditional privilege. Com-
pare N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 74 (McKinney 1992) (absolute) with Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 411.060 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) ("unless ... maliciously made"). The Supreme
Court's view on the absolute or conditional nature of the privilege is unclear. Elder,
supra note 32, at 297.
49. See, e.g., Borg v. Boas, 231 F.2d 788, 794-95 (9th Cir. 1956) (including within
the privilege a meeting to induce a judge to order a grand jury investigation); Hartzog
v. United Press Ass'ns, 202 F.2d 81, 82-83 (4th Cir. 1953) (extending the privilege to a
session of an executive committee of a state political party); Pinn v. Lawson, 72 F.2d
742, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1934) (including statements made at a meeting of a public
church); Kilgore v. Younger, 640 P.2d 793, 797-800 (Cal. 1982) (involving defamatory
statements made at a press conference of a state Attorney General); Restatement
Second, supra note 11, § 611 cmt. i (using as an example an assembly or gathering
open to the public, held for the purpose of dealing with a matter of public concern).
50. Elder, supra note 32, at 113; see, e.g., WKRG-TV v. Wiley, 495 So. 2d 617, 619
(Ala. 1986) (declining to apply privilege simply because meeting was public and mat-
ter was of public concern), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088 (1987).
51. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 13A-11-161 (1994); Cal. Civ. Code § 47 (1982); Ga. Code
Ann. § 51-5-7 (1982); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.060 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992);
Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-804 (1995); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 74 (McKinney 1992);
S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 20-11-5 (1995); Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-3 (1993).
52. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 13A-11-161 (1994) (proceeding in court); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 51-5-7 (1982) (proceeding of legislative or judicial bodies); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 411.060 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992) (proceeding before government body); Mont.
Code Ann. § 27-1-804 (1995) (public official proceeding); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 74
(McKinney 1992) (judicial, legislative, or other official proceeding); S.D. Codified
Laws Ann. § 20-11-5 (1995) (public official proceeding). But see, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code




Despite the broader view of the Restatement Second and isolated
older cases,53 almost all courts hold that the privilege of fair report
does not attach to publishing accounts of even official proceedings if
the proceedings are not also public.- This follows from the two ratio-
nales previously provided in support of the privilege. In the case of a
nonpublic proceeding, the media cannot act as an "agent" for an indi-
vidual who had no right to attend; nor should the media be permitted
to provide a supervisory function for the public greater than the pub-
lic's own supervisory responsibility.
2. Constitutional Privileges
In New York Times v. Sullivan,5 5 the Supreme Court declared that
defamation "can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional
limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First
Amendment."56 Thus, both common law and statutory state defama-
tion law must sometimes yield to constitutional concerns.
Constitutional privileges are defenses to claims of defamation and
are rooted in the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech.57
These privileges recognize that in some instances, an individual's in-
terest in his reputation is subordinate to the constitutional right to
publish information freely.5" For example, Sullivan's actual malice
standard is a constitutional privilege to publish statements regarding
public officials, that may prove to be false.59 In Sullivan, the Supreme
Court reasoned that a "rule compelling the critic of official conduct to
guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions.., leads to a compara-
ble 'self-censorship."'" The Court explained that such a rule may de-
ter criticism of official conduct, even if the would-be critic believed the
criticism to be true, out of fear of the inability to prove the truth in
court or the expense of doing so.61
Although not yet addressed by the Supreme Court, several federal
courts have adopted the privilege of neutral reportage as another con-
53. See supra notes 31-50 and accompanying text.
54. Eider, supra note 32, at 139; see, e.g., Stevenson v. News Syndicate Co., 96
N.Y.S.2d 751, 756 (App. Div. 1950) (explaining that applying privilege to publishing
information that public had no access to would be "illogical"). But see Reeves v.
American Broadcasting Cos., 719 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying California statu-
tory privilege to news story detailing charges in secret grand jury proceeding); In-
genere v. American Broadcasting Cos., 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1227, 1228-29 (D.
Mass. 1984) (extending privilege to confidential governmental reports revealing possi-
ble governmental misconduct).
55. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
56. Id. at 269.
57. John B. McCrory et al., Constitutional Privilege in Libel Law 15 (1994).
58. Id.
59. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80; McCrory et al., supra note 57, at 19.




stitutional privilege.62 The privilege derives from the same core First
Amendment concerns as the actual malice standard. 63 The privilege
protects media defendants from defamation liability for neutrally and
accurately reporting newsworthy charges against public figures, "re-
gardless of the reporter's private views regarding their validity. '
The constitutional privilege of neutral reportage finds support in
many of the same concerns that inspired the Sullivan Court to create
the actual malice standard. In Sullivan, the Court concluded that
some false speech concerning public officials must be protected to en-
sure that the necessary "breathing space" is afforded for publishing
true speech concerning public officials.65 Similarly, some neutrally re-
ported false speech must be tolerated to ensure "uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open" debate on public issues, the central theme of many
constitutional privileges.66
II. THE PRIVILEGE OF NEUTRAL REPORTAGE: EDWARDS V.
NA TIONA L AUDUBON SoCIEry
67
To understand fully the controversial privilege of neutral reportage,
a brief summary of the facts of Edwards, the case that created it, is
necessary. In the early 1970s, a debate raged around the use of the
insecticide DDT.' Proponents of the pesticide maintained that DDT
was necessary to save millions of human lives. They urged that with-
out DDT, many people would perish from insect-carried diseases
while others would die of starvation caused by destruction of crops by
insects.69 Environmental groups argued, however, that DDT endan-
gered nearby bird life.70
62. Kevin T. Baine & Chad E. Milton, Common Law Privileges for Defamatory
Communications 70-71 (1992); see, e.g., Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d
113, 120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977); Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881
F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1989); Barry v. Tune, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1984). In
1989, however, Justice Blackmun criticized a media defendant for not relying on the
privilege of neutral reportage in its defense. Harte-Hanks Communications v. Con-
naughton, 491 U.S. 657, 694 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun indicated
that if the Court were to adopt the privilege, the facts of Harte-Hanks would arguably
fit within it. Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 695.
63. Compare Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977) with Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269, 279.
64. Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.
65. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271-72.
66. For further discussion of the policy concerns driving the privilege of neutral
reportage, see infra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
67. 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
68. Id. at 116.
69. Id at 115-16. To emphasize the importance of DDT, Dr. J. Gordon Edwards
went so far as to refer to a proposed ban on DDT as "deliberately genocidal." Id. at
116. Dr. Edwards was a professor of entomology at San Jose State College in Califor-
nia. Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 423 F. Supp. 516, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
rev'd, 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
70. Edwards, 556 F.2d at 115.
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As one debate tactic, DDT advocates cited the National Audubon
Society's (the "Society") annual Christmas Bird Count (the "Count")
as evidence that the number of birds had actually grown despite the
increased use of DDT.7 Robert S. Arbib, Jr., an editor of the Count,
responded to the DDT advocates by prefacing the results of the Soci-
ety's 1971 Count with a warning against what he believed was a wide-
spread distortion of the results of previous Counts.' He instead
attributed the apparent increase in birds to a growing number of
more-skilled bird watchers with better access to viewing areas. 3
Arbib concluded: "Any time you hear a 'scientist' say the opposite,
you are in the presence of someone who is being paid to lie, or is
parroting something he knows little about."'74
John Devlin, a nature writer for the New York Times, was informed
of Arbib's accusations and asked Arbib for the names of those scien-
tists Arbib had termed "paid liars."175 Although Arbib and Devlin dis-
puted the ensuing conversation at trial, they agreed that Arbib had
supplied Devlin with a list of five eminent scientists, including Dr. J.
Gordon Edwards.76
After eliciting "both sides of the story to the best of his ability,"'
Devlin reported in the Times that "[s]egments of the pesticide indus-
try and certain 'scientist-spokesmen' [were] accused in... American
Birds of 'lying' by saying that bird life in America [was] thriving de-
spite the use of DDT."78 The Devlin article then attributed the accu-
sations to Arbib and listed the five scientists Arbib had named.79 The
article concluded by quoting verbatim from Arbib's foreword to the
Count.80
71. Id. at 116.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 116-17.
74. Id. at 117. Arbib's reference to those who were "paid to lie" expressed his
belief that many DDT proponents were actually pesticide industry spokesmen. Id.
75. Id.
76.. Id. At trial, Arbib maintained that he had given Devlin the names of scientists
along with a warning that the scientists were those that Arbib and Roland Clement,
the Society's Staff Biologist and Vice-President, believed to have most egregiously
distorted the statistics of past Counts. Id Arbib also maintained, however, that he
had specificaUy told Devlin that he, Arbib, would not refer to those scientists as "paid
liars." Id. Devlin, on the other hand, denied that Arbib had so cautioned him and
argued that Arbib had in fact made it clear that the named scientists were those re-
ferred to in Arbib's Foreword to the Count of 1971. Id.
77. Id. at 118. Devlin had tried to contact all five of the scientists named by Arbib.
He was successful, however, in reaching only three of them, each of whom denied the
charges. Id. at 117. This point is important as one of the elements of the privilege
created in Edwards is that the report must be neutral. See id. at 120.
78. Id. at 118. "American Birds" was the Society's publication containing the re-
sults of the annual Count. Id. at 116.
79. Id. at 118.
80. The Devlin article concluded:
"We are well aware," Mr. Arbib wrote, "that segments of the pesticide in-
dustry and certain paid 'scientist-spokesmen' are citing Christmas Bird
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Following the Times article, three of the five accused scientists sued
the Society and the Times for defamation.8 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York rendered judgment
for the plaintiffs based on the jury's finding of actual malice by the
Times.' The jury awarded damages to the plaintiffs83 and the defend-
ants appealed.
A. The Creation of, and Justification for, the Privilege
On appeal, Second Circuit Chief Judge Irving R. Kaufman reversed
the damage award of the district court.' He reasoned:
[W]hen a responsible, prominent organization . . .makes serious
charges against a public figure, the First Amendment protects the
accurate and disinterested reporting of those charges, regardless of
the reporter's private views regarding their validity.... We do not
believe that the press may be required under the First Amendment
to suppress newsworthy statements merely because it has serious
doubts regarding their truth. . . . The public interest in being fully
Count totals and other data in American Birds as proving that the bird life
of North America is thriving, and that many species are actually increasing
despite the widespread and condemned use of DDT....
"Serious Declines" Found
"This, quite obviously, is false and misleading, a distortion of the facts for
the most self-serving reasons. The truth is that many species ... are suffer-
ing serious declines in numbers as a direct result of pesticide
contamination....
"Anytime you hear a 'scientist' say the opposite," [Arbib] continued, "you
are in the presence of someone who is being paid to lie. ..
Id.
81. Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 423 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd,
556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977). Although not expressly
stated in the case, in their suit against the Tunes, the plaintiffs presumably relied on
the longstanding traditional rule that one who republishes a defamation is as guilty as
the original defamer. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
82. Edwards, 423 F. Supp. at 519. Specifically, the jury was instructed that the
Tunes could be found guilty of defamation with malice if Devlin had serious doubts
about the truth of the accusations, even if he believed that Arbib had made them, and
that he, Devlin, had reported them accurately. Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y,
556 F.2d 113, 119 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977). For a discussion of the
"actual malice" standard, see supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
83. Edwards, 423 F. Supp. at 516. Dr. Edwards was awarded $21,000 and Drs.
Jukes and White-Stevens were awarded $20,000 each. Edwards, 556 F.2d at 119.
84. Edwards, 556 F.2d at 122-23. Although Judge Kaufman believed that the evi-
dence in the case could not support a finding of actual malice by the Times, id. at 120-
21,-sufficient grounds in and of itself to reverse the district court's judgment-this
aspect of the case, discussed in dicta, is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discus-
sion of the burden of proof on a public figure defamation-plaintiff to prove malice, see
New York Tunes Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (defining actual malice as
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth). See also Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-78 (1986) (requiring plaintiff to prove actual falsity of
the statement as well as defendant's knowledge of falsity); supra notes 19-22 and ac-
companying text.
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informed about controversies that often rage around sensitive issues
demands that the press be afforded the freedom to report such
charges without assuming responsibility for them.as
With this statement, 6 the Second Circuit created the privilege of neu-
tral reportage, affording the media another constitutional protection
against liability for defamation.' At least in the Second Circuit,is the
First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech8 9 permits the me-
dia to republish, accurately and neutrally, newsworthy" defamatory
85. Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.
86. Interestingly, the Second Circuit created the controversial privilege of neutral
reportage in only one paragraph. Although several cases decided subsequent to Ed-
wards have discussed the privilege in greater length, only one other paragraph in
Judge Kaufman's opinion deals with the privilege. See id. (excluding from the privi-
lege a publisher who "espouses or concurs in the charges made by others"). Ibis lack
of a more comprehensive explanation of the privilege further supports the arguments
in parts III and IV regarding the privilege's scope. Arguably, the court did not con-
sider sufficiently the breadth of the privilege.
87. This safeguard attempts to protect the media not only from liability, but from
costly and often frivolous lawsuits as well. See Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech and Law
in a Free Society 53 (1981) (discussing plaintiffs with dubious cases using the law as a
"tool of harassment"). According to statistics furnished by The Libel Defense Re-
source Center in New York, the media is currently better protected than ever before.
For example, the average number of libel trials involving the media has declined by
more than half since the 1980s. Patricia G. Barnes, Who's Sorry Now?, 82 A.B.A. J.
20, 21 (Jan. 1996). Additionally, media-defendants won nearly half the jury trials in
1992-93, compared with approximately one quarter between 1980 and 1991. Id.
88. "With Edwards, the Second Circuit is a step ahead of the Supreme Court-not
always a safe place to be ... ." Floyd Abrams, The First Amendment in the Second
Circuit Reflections on Edwards v. National Audubon Society, The Past and The Fu-
ture, 65 St. John's L. Rev. 731, 741 (1991). Mr. Abrams, a partner at Cahill, Gordon &
Reindel, New York, represented the New York 7unes in Edwards. Id. at 731 nn.*-1.
Subsequent to Edwards, however, the Eighth Circuit also adopted a privilege of
neutral reportage. Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1434 (8th Cir. 1989);
see infra notes 133-140 and accompanying text.
89. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S.
Const. amend. I.
90. Under the Edwards privilege, the newsworthiness requirement is actually not
a requirement at all in the sense that it need be proven at trial. According to Judge
Kaufman, "[w]hat is newsworthy about such accusations is that they were made."
Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1002 (1977). As such, all false accusations by prominent organizations against public
figures are newsworthy, and a defendant need never prove newsworthiness: If all
other elements of the privilege obtain, the accusations are inherently newsworthy, if
they do not, the privilege is inapplicable despite an independent finding of
newsworthiness.
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statements made by responsible organizations against public figures.91
The original defamer, however, may still be found liable.'
The Second Circuit's justification for creating the privilege was the
public's interest in being fully informed about controversies surround-
ing sensitive issues.93 The interest is so strong that it "demands" that
the press be afforded the broadest protection to report charges involv-
ing these controversies.94
Considered against "the background of a profound national com-
mitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be unin-
hibited, robust, and wide-open," 95 it is evident that a constitutional
privilege was necessary to protect the media in at least some neutral
reportage cases. The policy concerns underlying the constitutional ac-
tual malice standard of Sullivan apply to the constitutional privilege of
neutral reportage as well. Specifically, in discussing the concerns lead-
ing to the actual malice standard, the Court recognized that "freedom
of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amend-
ment. '9 6 In fact, constitutional protection of free speech was designed
to ensure the possibility of interchanging ideas to bring about political
and social changes, unimpeded by state restrictions. 7
A large part of "the news" consists of reports of statements made
by persons other than news reporters. Often, the fact that those state-
ments were made is newsworthy in and of itself, regardless of the truth
or falsity of the statements.98 For example, if the President accused
the Vice President of embezzling federal funds, the public should
know of the accusation regardless of its truth. Reports of these types
of statements, according to Edwards, are the type of speech most de-
serving of constitutional protection. 99 One major goal of the First
91. The "public figure" requirement has been a topic of much debate. Although
explicitly included in the language of Edwards, Judge Kaufman failed to explain why
Dr. Edwards was in fact a public figure. See id Perhaps owing to this omission, many
cases and commentators have disregarded the public figure requirement. See, e.g.,
Barry v. Tune, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (extending the privilege
to all republications of serious charges, regardless of the original defamer's "trustwor-
thiness"); April v. Reflector-Herald, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 466, 469 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988)
(finding "no legitimate difference" between private and public plaintiffs for purposes
of applying the privilege).
92. Rodney A. Nelson, Neutral Reportage: Making Sense of Edwards v. National
Audubon Society, 20 Cap. U. L. Rev. 471, 492 (1991).
93. Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120. A similar suggested purpose of the privilege is the
benefit to the public from "freer reporting of raging controversies." McManus v.
Doubleday & Co., 513 F. Supp. 1383, 1391 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The Eighth Circuit, how-
ever, bases the privilege on other grounds, leading to its application in different cir-
cumstances. See infra notes 136-40 and accompanying text.
94. Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.
95. New York Tunes Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
96. Id. at 269.
97. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
98. Sack & Baron, supra note 13, § 6.3.2.
99. See Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.), cert de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
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Amendment is to ensure all opportunities for the public to resolve
public issues. Doubts concerning whether speech that is questionably
public speech should be protected must be resolved in favor of free
speech, not against it.10 Yet, absent a privilege of neutral reportage,
the common law rule against republication would render the media
reporters of these newsworthy statements liable for defamation. 1° 1
An argument can be made for broadening the privilege of neutral
reportage even further: The media publications are true and there-
fore not defamation. For example, if Prominent Citizen falsely ac-
cused Politician of accepting bribes, and Newswriter wrote in a daily
column: "Prominent Citizen accused Politician of accepting bribes,"
although Prominent Citizen's accusations may have in fact been false,
Newswriter's statement was true-Citizen did accuse Politician of ac-
cepting bribes. Courts that have discussed the privilege, and the Ed-
wards court in particular, however, have not developed this argument
to any significant extent.
The Constitution certainly places a premium on the right to publish
true speech."°2 The Court, however, has refused to "hold broadly that
truthful publication[s] may never be punished consistent with the First
Amendment.'10 3 Further, this truth argument is actually an attack on
the republication rule, imposing liability on republishers who truth-
fully attribute defamatory statements, 1 4 not on the scope of the privi-
lege. Thus, a limited privilege, applied only to further the aims of the
First Amendment, is appropriate.
B. Various Inappropriate Expansions of the Privilege
The exact parameters of the privilege of neutral reportage have
been the subject of much debate, and it is unclear whether the Ed-
wards court intended them as parameters altogether. At its inception,
the requirements of the privilege seemed to be that: (1) the original
declarant be a "responsible, prominent organization;" (2) the republi-
cation be "newsworthy;" (3) the republication be "accurate and disin-
terested;" and (4) the defamed be a public figure.'1 5
Subsequent cases and commentators, however, have questioned
whether the Second Circuit intended the "elements" set forth in Ed-
100. William 0. Douglas, The Right of the People 41 (1958). This Note argues,
however, that the privilege of neutral reportage should protect only some of these
statements, namely, only those that are also on matters of public concern. See infra
part IV.
101. See Sack & Baron, supra note 13, § 6.1.
102. See generally Florida Star v. BJ.F. 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (reversing on First
Amendment grounds a damage award against appellant for publishing truthfully the
lawfully obtained identity of a rape victim).
103. Id. at 532.
104. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
105. Edwards v. National Audubon Soe'y, 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
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wards to serve as requirements, or merely to aid in applying the amor-
phous privilege to the facts of a particular case.10 6 As such, various
courts have redefined the privilege. In fact, courts have either rede-
fined or rejected each of Edwards' four apparent requirements. 1 7 A
closer look at the constitutional foundations of the privilege, however,
leads to the conclusion that the elements delineated by the Edwards
court are the proper elements to further the constitutional concerns
raised in a neutral reportage context.
1. Prominence
Courts have not uniformly accepted the requirement that the origi-
nal defamer must be a responsible, prominent organization. In fact,
courts have rejected both the responsible and prominent component
and the organization component of the requirement. As for the or-
ganization component, there does not appear to be a basis for distin-
guishing between defamatory statements made by organizations and
those made by individuals. 08 The term "organization" was likely in-
cluded in Edwards as factual support for the privilege.'0 9 Few courts,
therefore, have refused to apply the privilege on grounds that an indi-
vidual, rather than an organization, had made the defamatory
accusations.110
The Court of Appeals of Illinois properly considered the responsi-
ble and prominent requirement of Edwards to be critical. In Fogus v.
Capital Cities Media, Inc.,"' the court stated, without ruling on the
validity of the privilege, that if the First Amendment required the
106. See, e.g., Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 68 (2d Cir. 1980)
(stating that Edwards did not attempt to define precisely the contours of the privi-
lege); Note, The Developing Privilege of Neutral Reportage, 69 Va. L. Rev. 853, 862
n.48 (1983) [hereinafter The Developing Privilege] (questioning whether the elements
of the Edwards privilege were intended as a "doctrinal test").
As an example of this ambiguity, Edwards applies the privilege "when a responsi-
ble, prominent organization ... makes serious charges against a public figure." Ed-
wards, 556 F.2d at 120. It is unclear, however, whether the Second Circuit intended to
limit application of the privilege to defamatory statements by prominent organiza-
tions, or referred to prominent organizations only because the facts of Edwards in-
volved a prominent organization.
107. This Note focuses primarily on only the "newsworthiness" requirement of Ed-
wards. The following three subparts deal briefly with the treatment of the three other
requirements by various courts. The analysis is included only to raise some of the
issues surrounding the privilege of neutral reportage and illustrate how the Edwards
version of those elements is most in line with the constitutional bases of the privilege.
The discussion is not intended to be exhaustive.
108. Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1125 n.18 (N.D. Cal. 1984); The Devel-
oping Privilege, supra note 106, at 865 n.64.
109. See DiSalle v. P.G. Publishing Co., 544 A.2d 1345, 1358 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)
(stating that there is no reason to believe that the Edwards court intended a distinc-
tion between organizations and individuals).
110. But see Martin v. Wilson Publishing Co., 497 A.2d 322, 329-30 (R.I. 1985) (re-
quiring that the defamer be a prominent organization).
111. 444 N.E.2d 1100 (IMI. App. Ct. 1983).
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privilege of neutral reportage, the privilege would nevertheless not
apply to republications by the media of allegations of police miscon-
duct made by unnamed youths who had been arrested.1 2 The Fogus
court presumably reached its conclusion because the youths were not
responsible and prominent." 3
This analysis affords the proper import to the responsible and prom-
inent requirement in light of the purposes of the Edwards privilege.
The Second Circuit created the privilege to ensure that the type of
speech central to the First Amendment would be adequately pro-
tected.1 4 The prominence requirement acts as a safeguard to pro-
mote that aim by ensuring that all false speech protected by the
privilege is, at minimum, made by individuals holding positions in
which the public generally has an interest in hearing. Conversely,
anonymous and unverifiable accusations that will not likely serve the
public's interest in being informed of, or having the opportunity to
comment on, matters of public concern, will not be unduly protected.
In Barry v. Time, Inc.," 5 however, a California court strayed from
those aims and expanded the privilege by rejecting the trustworthiness
aspect implicit in the responsible and prominent requirement. The
Barry court required prominence only in the sense that the defamer's
identity must be known, explaining that the Fogus court refused to
apply the privilege because the defamers were "unnamed," and not
because of a lack of trustworthiness. 1 6 Thus, the Barry court applied
the privilege to a neutral and accurate publication of the defamatory
accusations of a convicted felon who failed a lie detector test." 7
112. d at 1102.
113. But see Barry v. Tune, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1125-26 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (ex-
plaining that the Fogus court refused to apply the privilege because the youths were
unnamed, rather than because of their lack of trustworthiness).
114. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
115. 584 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
116. Id at 1125-26; see also Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 989 n.39 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (questioning whether the privilege obtained when the source of the defamation
was anonymous).
117. Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1110. But see Davis v. Keystone Printing Serv., 14 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 1225, 1232 (IMI. App. Ct. 1987) (finding that an alcoholic and ex-drug
addicts were not "responsible" for purpose of applying privilege).
Expanding the privilege even further, the Barry court held that to apply the privi-
lege when the defamed is a public figure, a court must determine only that the de-
famer was a party to an ongoing controversy surrounding the defamation and that the
report is accurate. Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1125, 1127. Paradoxically, however, the
Barry court acknowledged that the broad ongoing-controversy requirement may in
fact limit the privilege and prevent its application when it might otherwise attach. See
id. at 1127. For example, under this construction of the privilege, if X and Y are
embroiled in a public and newsworthy controversy, and public figure Z intervenes and
defames Y, even a neutral and accurate report of Z's accusation would not be privi-
leged. Other courts that have adopted the ongoing controversy requirement include
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in RRZ Public Markets
Inc. v. Bond Buyer, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1409 (E.D. Pa. 1995), and the Superior
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Furthermore, in McBride v. Merrell Dow & Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,118 the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia disre-
garded the requirement that the original defamer be a responsible and
prominent organization altogether. The court would apply the privi-
lege whenever the statement was made by any "public official."' 1 9
2. Public Figures
Controversy also surrounds the Edwards requirement that the de-
famed be a public figure. For example, the Tenth Circuit, in Dixson v.
Newsweek, Inc.,' 20 properly limited the privilege to cases involving
public figures and rejected applying it to cases involving private plain-
tiffs, regardless of newsworthiness.' 2' Conversely, in Krauss v. Cham-
paign News Gazette, Inc.,l2 2 the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth
District, disregarded the public figure requirement and stated that the
privilege applies to statements regarding all public issues, regardless
of whether the defamed was a public figure.'2 3
A closer look at who is a public figure suggests that the public figure
requirement also furthers the aim of protecting only the type of
speech that ought to be afforded constitutional protection. Individu-
als deemed to have been public figures by various courts include a
television entertainer,2 4 a political author, 125 a nationally known min-
ister, 26 and a former military official who served on several presiden-
tial panels.' 27 Neutral reports of newsworthy accusations leveled
against these public figures will likely involve issues about which the
public has a strong interest in being informed. As stated in Edwards,
"[i]t is unfortunate that the exercise of liberties so precious as freedom
of speech and of the press may sometimes do harm that the state is
powerless to recompense: but this is the price that must be paid for
the blessings of a democratic way of life."' 28
Court of Pennsylvania in DiSalle v. P.G. Publishing Co., 544 A.2d 1345, 1363 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988).
118. 540 F. Supp. 1252 (D.D.C. 1982).
119. See id. at 1255; see also Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1125 (rejecting the need for ad
hoc determinations of newsworthiness).
120. 562 F.2d 626 (10th Cir. 1977).
121. See id. at 631 (limiting protection of Edwards to defamations of public figures).
122. 375 N.E.2d 1362 (IMI. App. Ct. 1978).
123. The privilege applies to all "public issues, personalities, or programs." Id. at
1363; see April v. Reflector-Herald, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 466, 469 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988)
(rejecting Dixson and applying the privilege to a case of a defamed private figure).
124. Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 209-10 (7th Cir. 1976).
125. Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 885 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062
(1977).
126. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988).
127. Secord v. Cockburn, 747 F. Supp. 779, 784 (D.D.C. 1990).
128. Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113, 122 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
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Conversely, a research scientist 9 and an individual held in con-
tempt of court for failing to appear before a grand jury investigating
Soviet espionage in the United States were held not to be public
figures.130 The Supreme Court has even deemed a litigant in a divorce
proceeding who held several press conferences for the benefit of the
media only a private figure. 1" Just as the Supreme Court refused to
require those private figure plaintiffs to prove actual malice, the Con-
stitution does not afford a privilege to publish accounts of false
charges against them.
The public figure requirement, however, serves only as a first hur-
dle. If the accusations against public figures are nevertheless not of
the type that the public has a strong interest in being informed of, the
requirement that the charges be newsworthy attempts to ensure that
only proper speech is protected.
This public figure element of the privilege will often overlap with
the newsworthiness requirement because many activities of public
figures will be newsworthy. The newsworthiness of the activity, how-
ever, is not conclusive that the individual involved is a public figure. 13
3. Accuracy and Disinterest
Even the requirement that the report be accurate and disinterested
has been applied differently in different jurisdictions. Specifically, the
Eighth Circuit's neutrality requirement, as explained below, is signifi-
cantly more permissive than that of the Second Circuit, based on the
slightly different rationale cited in support of the privilege.1 33
In Price v. Viking Penguin, Inc.,'3 an FBI agent, Price, sued an au-
thor and Viking Penguin, a publishing company, for defamation.
Price alleged that the author's book on the government's treatment of
American Indians, and specifically Price's role in a shootout in South
Dakota, libelously accused him of several acts of misconduct. 135 In
adopting the privilege of neutral reportage, the court emphasized the
"robust, and wide-open" debate theory underlying the Sullivan136 ac-
tual malice requirement, 137 rather than the public interest in being in-
formed of public controversies emphasized in Edwards.' s Because of
129. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135-36 (1979).
130. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167-68 (1979).
131. Tune, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-55 n.3 (1976).
132. Id.
133. Mark W. Page, Price v. Viling Penguin, Inc.: The Neutral Reportage Privilege
and Robus Wide Open Debate, 75 Mfinn. L. Rev. 157, 179-80 (1990).
134. 676 F. Supp. 1501 (D. Minn. 1988), affd, 881 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1989).
135. Id at 1502-03.
136. New York Tunes Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
137. Price v. Vldng Penguin, Inc., 881 F.2d 1426, 1430 (8th Cir. 1989); see Page,
supra note 133, at 158, 184-85.
138. Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
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this slight difference in doctrinal bases, the Eighth Circuit's privilege is
broader than that of the Second Circuit. The Eighth Circuit would
protect from liability a one-sided report, provided the defamatory
statements were reported neutrally,13 because such a report would
lead to wide open debate of the issue. Moreover, the publisher could
either passionately support or even zealously attack the defamed and
the defamed's position, provided the defamatory statements were ac-
curately reported. 4 Thus, in Viking, the publication was privileged
despite the author's active participation in the debate. In contrast, the
Second Circuit would focus on the information's value, which would
be sufficiently high only if both sides of the controversy were
presented fairly. Accordingly, the Second Circuit would not protect
an author who participated in a debate through his defamation.
McManus v. Doubleday & Co., Inc. 141 raised another issue regard-
ing the neutrality requirement. In McManus, the court refused to ex-
tend the privilege to a neutral republication that arose from
investigative reporting.142 At least one commentator has suggested,
however, that this limitation is not an additional limitation at all,
rather it derives from the neutrality requirement of Edwards. Argua-
bly, when a reporter investigates and actively solicits a defamatory
comment, the reporter is no longer "neutrally" reporting. 43
4. Newsworthiness
The final element of the privilege of neutral reportage is that the
neutrally reported accusations need be newsworthy.1'" This require-
ment, however, is overbroad, and this Note therefore proposes limit-
ing its scope. An analysis of the current scope of the newsworthiness
element of the privilege follows.
139. See Viking, 881 F.2d at 1434 (citing Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300,
1304 (8th Cir. 1986)). The Eighth Circuit held that publishing a reporter's "general
disposition toward his topic" is not indicative of concurrence with a particular allega-
tion. Id. In Edwards, however, the court emphasized the facts that both sides of the
story were elicited and that both sides of the controversy were presented neutrally.
See Edwards, 556 F.2d at 117-18. Similarly, in Russo v. Padovano, 446 N.Y.S.2d 645,
647 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New
York held that stating facts and opinions supporting the defamatory implication was
not neutral reportage.
140. Page, supra note 133, at 184 nn.142-45 and accompanying text.
141. 513 F. Supp. 1383 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
142. Id at 1391. In McManus, a Roman Catholic priest sued an author, a coauthor,
and a publisher of a book which quoted his Irish Embassy file referring to the priest
as having "homicidal tendencies." Id at 1385. The court refused to extend the privi-
lege in that case because the charges by the Embassy were solicited actively by the
author. Id. at 1391.
143. David McCraw, The Right to Republish Libel: Neutral Reportage and the Rea-
sonable Reader, 25 Akron L. Rev. 335, 341 (1991).
144. Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
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Somewhat circularly, the Second Circuit has stated only that
"[w]hat is newsworthy about [particular] accusations is that they were
made."' 45 The court gave no further guidance as to what was news-
worthy other than alluding to the aims of the First Amendment. 46
Federal cases in other areas of law, however, provide some examples
of what types of issues are newsworthy, and thus protected under Ed-
wards. Some examples of these cases follow.
In 1957, Ilya Wolston's uncle and aunt were arrested on, and
pleaded guilty to, charges of espionage. Pursuant to grand jury sub-
poenas to investigate Mr. Wolston's possible connection to the espio-
nage, Mr. Wolston travelled to Washington, D.C. While there, he
failed to respond to one subpoena and was held in contempt of court.
Shortly after a number of newspapers reported the incident, the pub-
licity surrounding Mr. Wolston subsided and he resumed living a pri-
vate lifestyle. But in 1974, Reader's Digest Association published a
book describing the Soviet Union's espionage organization, naming
Wolston as a Soviet agent living in the United States. 47 In Wolston v.
Reader's Digest Association,"4 Mr. Wolston's libel suit against the
publisher, the Supreme Court held that Wolston was not a public fig-
ure merely because he was involved in a matter that attracted public
attention.14 9 The Court did allow, however, that Wolston's failure to
appear before the grand jury was newsworthy. 5 0
In Richmond v. Southwire Co.,' 5 Southwire Company terminated
several employees who had either admitted to drug use, refused to
take a polygraph test regarding alleged drug use, or failed a polygraph
test and had been seen using drugs on company property. Local news-
papers ran stories of the investigation and terminations, along with a
statement prepared by the company placed under the headlines in
such a way as to suggest that all of the discharged employees had been
terminated for drug use. The former employees sued on several
grounds, including defamation. The district court applied an Arkan-
sas qualified privilege to publish defamatory statements made in good
faith to protect one's own interests." In affirming the court's deci-
sion, the Eighth Circuit referred to the "small-town employer's" in-
vestigation into the conduct of its employees as newsworthy. 53
In Reuber v. Food Chemical News, Inc.,1' Melvin Reuber was a
scientist at a private research center affiliated with the National Can-
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 157 (1979).
148. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
149. Id at 168.
150. Id. at 167.
151. 980 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1992).
152. Id. at 519-20.
153. Id. at 520.
154. 925 F.2d 703 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991).
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cer Institute (the "NCI"), a federal agency.15 5 At the time, the NCI's
official position on the pesticide malathion was that it was non-carci-
nogenic. Reuber, "a self-styled whistleblower," however, dissemi-
nated his own research in a manner which created the impression that
the NCI had reversed its position on the safety of malathion. In re-
sponse, Reuber's supervisor reprimanded Reuber in writing for pro-
moting inadequate research and "subverting public confidence in the
NCI." Shortly thereafter, a news publication published most of the
supervisor's reprimands,5 6 culled from an anonymous leak.5 7
In Reuber's suit against the paper for defamation and invasion of
privacy for publishing the supervisor's letter, the trial judge relied on
the statement of the paper's editor that she would have published the
reprimands even if some of them were false because it was news-
worthy that a director of a federally funded research center falsely
accused an employee of impropriety. 5
Finally, in Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,"s the Ninth Circuit re-
jected a claim of wrongful appropriation of plaintiff's likeness because
the article in which the defendant used plaintiff's picture was news-
worthy. 160 In that case, Peggy Ault was a member of an organization
founded to oppose an adult video store, and had picketed adult stores
in that capacity.' 6' A local Oregon paper featuring Ault discussed
Ault's anti-pornography activities, and included a photograph of Ault
"superimposed over the rear-end of a bent-over naked man."' 6
Although these cases do not involve the privilege of neutral report-
age, they do involve allegations of defamation, and were decided us-
ing defamation law analyses. The choice of the term of art
"newsworthy" by each of the courts is therefore particularly insightful
when considering the Edwards privilege. 16 3 As the Edwards court
chose the same term, the Second Circuit presumably sought to protect
accurate reports of accusations leveled in these, and similar, con-
texts. 64 The issues in these cases, however, do not appear to impli-
cate the type of speech concerns underlying constitutional privileges.
155. Reuber worked for the Frederick Cancer Research Center, operated by Litton
Bionetics under a contract with the National Cancer Institute. Id. at 706.
156. Iat
157. Id at 707.
158. IL at 716.
159. 860 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1988).
160. Id. at 883.
161. Id at 879.
162. Id.
163. Although Edwards was decided before the cases discussed above, and thus the
Edwards court could not have relied on them for guidance in choosing the term
"newsworthy," the cases are nevertheless instrumental, as they illustrate how the term
has evolved in defamation jurisprudence since the Edwards decision. Thus, it is im-
portant that courts consider these cases, and the type of speech they protect, in apply-
ing the privilege of neutral reportage and evaluating its scope.
164. This assumes, of course, that the other elements of the privilege are present.
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They are therefore undeserving of protection by a privilege of neutral
reportage rooted in those concerns. Specifically, the public will be no
less informed of "controversies that often rage around sensitive is-
sues"'165 if it does not hear about charges leveled in these so called
"newsworthy" contexts.
C. Rejecting the Privilege: Dickey v. CBS Inc" 6
Despite the flexibility available in applying the privilege of neutral
reportage in any of its variant forms, the privilege has been both
criticized at length and rejected outright by several courts' 68 and com-
mentators. 69 The Third Circuit, for example, found neither the Sec-
ond Circuit's nor the Eighth Circuit's justifications persuasive and
rejected the privilege within one year of its creation.17
In Dickey v. CBS Inc.,' several congressional candidates had been
interviewed and videotaped by the television program "Update." In
response to a question regarding inflation, one candidate, incumbent
Congressman Lawrence G. Williams, related a story that charged Sam
Dickey with receiving illegal payoffs.172 Before the program was to
air, Dickey told the station,17 through his attorney, that the charges
were both false and defamatory and asked the station to postpone the
broadcast until Williams's accusation could be investigated. The sta-
tion refused to comply with Dickey's request and broadcast the pro-
gram together with a live appearance by Dickey's attorney denying
the charges and the existence of the report. 74 Dickey sued CBS for
republishing Williams's defamatory comments17 5 and the district court
165. Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
166. 583 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978).
167. See supra part I.B.2.
168. See infra notes 188-91 and accompanying texL
169. See, e.g., Dennis J. Dobbels, Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc.: A
Constitutional Privilege to Republish Defamation Should Be Rejected, 33 Hastings LJ.
1203 (1982) (concluding that the privilege of neutral reportage is inconsistent with
First Amendment theory).
170. See Dickey, 583 F.2d at 1225.
171. 583 F.2d 1221 (3d Cir. 1978).
172. Id. at 1222-24. The motive behind Williams' accusation was that Dickey was a
member of the War Board, the Delaware County Republican organization that was
endorsing Williams' opponent, Delaware County District Attorney Stephen I.
McEwen. Williams maintained that District Attorney McEwen knew about the
payoffs-they were allegedly in a report known as the "Sprague Report"-but was
not acting on this knowledge because Dickey was McEwen's district's representative
on the War Board. Id. at 1222. McEwen denied the Sprague Report's existence. Id. at
1222-23.
173. The program was to be broadcasted by CBS's Philadelphia affiliate, WCAU-
TV, Channel 10. Id. at 1221.
174. Id. at 1223-24.




held that although Williams's allegations were false, Dickey had not
met his burden of proving malice. 17 6
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment for CBS on the
grounds that Dickey had not proven malice by the requisite stan-
dard. 77 Before doing so, however, Circuit Judge James Hunter, III
was quick to reject CBS's invitation to adopt the privilege created in
Edwards.178
Judge Hunter pointed out that publishing newsworthy remarks
"without fear of a libel suit even if the publisher 'has serious doubts
regarding their truth'... is contrary to the Supreme Court's ruling in
St. Amant. "'7 In St. Amant v. Thompson, °80 the Court held that pub-
lishing with serious doubts of the truth of the publication demon-
strates actual malice under Sullivan, and invites liability. 18'
The Third Circuit mentioned neither a public interest in being fully
informed, nor in robust, wide open debate, and refused to extend con-
stitutional protection to CBS's republication of Williams's accusations,
regardless of their newsworthiness. 18 The court recognized that often
defamatory statements "are of such slight social value"' 8 3 that any
176. Dickey, 441 F. Supp. at 1141-42. The Third Circuit agreed with the district
court, which read St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), to require "proof by
clear and convincing evidence 'that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts
as to the truth' of the charges." Dickey, 583 F.2d at 1225.
177. Dickey, 583 F.2d at 1229.
178. "At the outset, we reject [CBS's] invitation to adopt Edwards [] as the rule of
this Court." Id. at 1225 (emphasis added).
179. Id (quoting Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977)).
180. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
181. Id. at 731.
182. Dickey v. CBS Inc., 583 F.2d 1221, 1226 (3d Cir. 1978). In a footnote, the
court further attacked the neutral reportage privilege, pointing out its inconsistency
with the Supreme Court's holding in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
Dickey, 583 F.2d at 1226 n.5. In Gertz, the Court rejected the "public or general
interest" test set up in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), and
shifted the focus of defamation suits against the media from the content of the publi-
cation to the public or private status of the defamed. The Edwards privilege, as read
by the Third Circuit, however, focuses instead on the newsworthiness of the state-
ment. Dickey, 583 F.2d at 1226 n.5.
The Third Circuit's rejection of the privilege is especially noteworthy for two rea-
sons. First, Judge Hunter rejected the privilege before discussing the malice issue on
which the case turned, seizing the first opportunity to do so. See supra note 178 and
accompanying text. Second, in aligning Dickey as pro-media or pro-plaintiff, the case
seems to be pro-media and in favor of broader free speech protection as the court
ruled for the defendant CBS, applying a rigid SullivanlSt. Amant standard of proving
malice. The court did so despite acknowledging the trial court's consideration of the
facts that (a) "Bill Baldini, a Channel 10 reporter familiar with Delaware County
politics ... viewed Williams' charges with a jaundiced eye," Dickey, 583 F.2d at 1223-
24; (b) Stephen McEwen denied the Sprague Report's existence during the taping of
the program; and (c) Williams had never previously made these accusations. Id at
1224. Nevertheless, the media-sympathetic court was quick to reject the privilege.
183. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
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benefit to be derived from them is greatly outweighed by society's
"interest in order and morality.' 1
Three years after Dickey, the Third Circuit revisited the neutral re-
portage privilege in Medico v. Time, Inc.ass In Medico, the plaintiff
sued Time, Inc. for publishing a summary of an FBI report that identi-
fied the plaintiff as a member of an organized crime family."s The
Third Circuit affirmed a summary judgment for Tine, holding that the
republication of FBI reports was protected by the privilege of fair re-
port.187 In discussing its recognition of the First Amendment interests
involved in the case, the court mentioned the privilege of neutral re-
portage. The court, however, made it clear that it was not adopting
the privilege as the law of the Third Circuit.' s
Several state cases have similarly rejected the privilege.' 9 For ex-
ample, in Hogan v. Herald Co.,190 the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York held that:
[I]t is not possible to reconcile [the privilege of neutral reportage]
with [the Supreme Court's] prior decision in Gertz .... The une-
quivocal holding of Gertz is that a publisher's immunity is based
upon the status of the plaintiff, not the subject matter of the publi-
cation. Presumably, all publications of the news media are news-
worthy. They are not privileged, however, unless the publisher is
free of culpable conduct under the standards stated in [Sullivan and
Gertz].191
Interestingly, Hogan was decided in New York, the same state in
which the Second Circuit created the privilege.
III. THE SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE OF NEUTRAL REPORTAGE
MUST BE RECONSIDERED
As explained, the neutral reportage privilege of Edwards protects
publishing neutral and accurate accounts of newsworthy speech. By
184. Id.
185. 643 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1981).
186. Medico v. Time, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 268, 269-70 (E.D. Pa. 1980), affid, 643 F.2d
134 (3d Cir. 1981).
187. Medico, 643 F.2d at 140, 147. The court accepted the fair report privilege as it
was presented in the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the law of Pennsylvania. Id. at
138. The court then expanded the privilege to include FBI reports as "official" for
purposes of applying the doctrine. Id. at 138-42.
188. "We are careful to point out that we do not decide at this time that the First
Amendment immunizes a newspaper's republication of a defamation arising in con-
nection with a matter of public interest." Id. at 145.
189. See, eg., Tunney v. American Broadcasting Co., 441 N.E.2d 86, 92 (I11. App.
Ct. 1982) (citing Newell v. Field Enters., 415 N.E.2d 434, 452 (IMI. App. Ct. 1980)
(maintaining that no constitutional privilege protects reporting defamatory matters));
Postill v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 325 N.W.2d 511, 518 (Mich. C. App. 1982) (declin-
ing to embrace Edwards because the press is adequately protected by Sullivan's mal-
ice requirement).
190. 446 N.Y.S.2d 836 (N.Y. App. Div.), affda 444 N.E.2d 1002 (N.Y. 1982).
191. Id at 842.
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using the term newsworthy loosely without attempting to define it,'9
the Second Circuit created a constitutional privilege that is broader
than necessary to serve the purposes of the First Amendment. This
part explains the First Amendment importance of speech on matters
of public concern and why such speech deserves constitutional protec-
tion. Speech that is merely newsworthy, however, is not necessarily of
public concern.' 93 It thus does not always deserve constitutional
protection.
A. The Privilege Is in Line with the Focus of Current Supreme
Court Defamation Analysis
One of the primary arguments raised against the neutral reportage
privilege is that the focus of the privilege is inconsistent with the focus
of current Supreme Court defamation analysis. In creating the privi-
lege, the Edwards court focused on the newsworthiness of the accusa-
tions in holding that their republication should be protected. 94 Judge
Kaufman emphasized the public interest in being fully informed of
newsworthy controversies. 1
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 96 decided three years before Ed-
wards, however, the Supreme Court held that in defamation suits
against the media, the Sullivan standard necessarily applies only when
the plaintiff is a public figure. 197 Among the justifications the Court
provided for focusing on the status of the defamed, were a content
analysis' inadequate protection of the rights of private plaintiffs and
the inappropriateness of having judges decide which publications were
newsworthy. 198 Although the Third Circuit in Dickey refused to adopt
the Edwards privilege primarily on grounds that the privilege was in-
consistent with St. Amant,' 99 the court also acknowledged this appar-
ent inconsistency with Gertz.0 °
192. See Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
193. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 421 (1989) (Stevens, Brennan, and
Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (acknowledging that a report
of inadequate medical treatment for federal prisoners was "both newsworthy and of
great public importance"); Tme, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 488-49 n.1 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that a particular divorce proceeding was "unques-
tionably newsworthy" but not of "real public or general concern").
194. Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.
195. Id
196. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
197. See id at 345-46 (affording states broad discretion in providing a remedy for
private individual-defamation plaintiffs).
198. Id at 346.
199. Dickey v. CBS Inc., 583 F.2d 1221, 1225 (3d Cir. 1978); see supra notes 179-81
and accompanying text.
200. Id. at 1226 n.5. Other cases making this argument from Gertz against the priv-
ilege of neutral reportage include Hogan v. Herald Co., 446 N.Y.S.2d 836, 842 (N.Y.
App. Div.), affid, 444 N.E.2d 1002 (N.Y. 1982) (arguing impossibility of reconciling
Edwards with Gertz) and Newell v. Field Enters., 415 N.E.2d 434, 452 (I1. App. Ct.
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In 1985, however, the Supreme Court refocused its inquiry once
again. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,20 1 a plu-
rality of the Court permitted recovery of presumed and punitive dam-
ages absent a showing of actual malice by the plaintiff when the
defamation involved a private matter.2° The plurality thus limited
Gertz's burden of proving presumed and punitive damages to cases of
private figures involved in matters of public concern.'
Upon closer inspection, perhaps what drove the plurality in Dun &
Bradstreet to reinstate the of public concern inquiry was that such a
determination was often necessary even under Gertz.2' In Gertz, the
Court acknowledged two types of public figures: those who had at-
tained general notoriety, and those who were "public" only within the
context of the issue surrounding the defamation suit. 0 5 Inherent in
most determinations that a plaintiff is a "limited-purpose public fig-
ure" is a preliminary determination that the underlying controversy is
of public concern.0 6
In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Heppsm7 the Court added to
Sullivan's actual malice standard, requiring an appropriate plaintiff to
prove not only knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth,
but also the falsity of the statement.208 Notably, the plaintiff in Hepps
was a private figure involved in a matter of public concern.2°9 The
Hepps Court clearly adopted Dun & Bradstreet's extension of the ac-
tual malice standard to at least some private figures. Thus, contrary to
what cases such as Hogan v. Herald Company210 and Newell v. Field
Enterprises,211 both decided before Dun & Bradstreet,21 2 suggest, the
general focus of the Edwards inquiry is presently in line with the focus
of the Supreme Court in constitutional defamation analysis.
1980) (noting constitutional libel protections turn on status of plaintiff, regardless of
newsworthiness of speech). But see Scott E. Saef, Neutral Reportage: The Case for a
Statutory Privilege, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 417, 430-32 (1992) (arguing that since 1985 the
Court has refocused its emphasis towards the content of the allegedly libelous speech,
justifying the Edwards privilege).
201. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
202. Id. at 763.
203. Whether Dun & Bradstreet similarly limited other aspects of Gertz is beyond
the scope of this Note, and is therefore not discussed here.
204. Joan E. Schaffner, Note, Protection of Reputation Versus Freedom of Expres-
sion: Striking a Manageable Compromise in the Tort of Defamation, 63 S. Cal. L Rev.
433, 447 (1990).
205. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345, 352 (1974).
206. Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980).
207. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
208. Id. at 768-69; supra note 19.
209. Hepps, 475 U.S. at 776.
210. 446 N.Y.S.2d 836 (N.Y. App. Div.), affd, 444 N.E.2d 1002 (N.Y. 1982).
211. 415 N.E.2d 434 (M1l. App. Ct. 1980).
212. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
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But despite Dun & Bradstreet's mooting of the various courts' argu-
ments from Gertz, the privilege of neutral reportage nevertheless re-
mains somewhat broader than is appropriate. Particularly, the current
of public concern standard of Dun & Bradstreet is more limited than
the newsworthiness standard of Edwards.
B. The Privilege Is Beyond the Scope of Current Supreme Court
Defamation Analysis
The Supreme Court has long recognized that "not all speech is of
equal First Amendment importance."2 3 Although the Court has nar-
rowed the scope of defamation as a categorical exception to free
speech, a "limited categorical approach has remained an important
part of [the Court's] First Amendment jurisprudence."'214 A "right to
say what one pleases about public affairs is... the minimum guaran-
tee of the First Amendment. 2 1 5
1. The Supreme Court and Matters of Public Concern
In 1983, Connick v. Myers2 16 marked the first time the Supreme
Court recognized matters of public concern as a "content-based cate-
gory of privileged 'public issue' speech," deserving of special protec-
tions.2 17 In Connick, Ms. Myers, an assistant district attorney, was
informed that she would be transferred from one section of the crimi-
nal court to another.2 18 In response, she circulated a questionnaire to
her officemates inquiring about their views on, among other things,
213. Id. at 758.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), was the first case to explicitly demarcate
"stratification at the upper reaches of the First Amendment." Cynthia L. Estlund,
Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment
Category, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 22 (1990). Speech on matters of public concern,
however, is not the only category of speech afforded a level of protection based on its
hierarchical relation to other First Amendment speech. In fact, most speech is now
subject to this type of stratification.
Historically, the Supreme Court focused only on whether a class of speech was
protected under the First Amendment; if it was, it was entirely, if it wasn't, it wasn't at
all. Currently, however, many categories of previously unprotected speech have
eroded. Now, the Court's inquiry is whether particular speech within one of the his-
torically excluded classifications is favored or disfavored. An example can clarify this
distinction. Obscenity was historically an exception to free speech and fell outside of
First Amendment protection. Today, however, there are gradations of obscene
speech, ranging from patently obscene speech afforded little or no protection to
merely offensive speech, afforded greater protection but still not the level of
protection afforded matters of public concern. For a more thorough discussion of this
trend in many areas of previously excluded speech, see id. at 13-28.
214. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992).
215. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297 (1964) (Black and Douglas,
JJ., concurring).
216. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
217. Estlund, supra note 213, at 2.
218. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140.
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the transfer policy of the office.219 Ms. Myers's supervisors then ter-
minated her employment for "creating a 'mini-insurrection' within the
office."" 2  Myers sued and was victorious at both the district court
and Circuit Court of Appeals levels on the grounds that she had been
fired for exercising her right to free speech."' The Supreme Court
reversed, however, holding that Ms. Myers had raised no constitu-
tional claim, as the speech in question-the questionnaire-was not
on a matter of public concern.'
The matters of public concern standard of Connick is more restric-
tive than the newsworthiness standard of Edwards. The majority of
the questions in Myers's questionnaire-those regarding "office trans-
fer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, [and] the
level of confidence in supervisors"2-were certainly newsworthy
when viewed in light of circumstances deemed newsworthy by various
Circuit Court cases.' 4 The average citizen would be at least as inter-
ested in learning of the greivances of an assistant district attorney as
he would be of learning that Peggy Ault felt strongly about her views
on pornography.' Had Myers's questionnaire instead been a memo
of false accusations against the office supervisors, it would likely have
cleared the low hurdle of newsworthiness required by Edwards. '
But, according to the Court in Connick, the questionnaire did not re-
gard matters of public concern.' 7
In a defamation context, the case in which the Court recognized the
value of speech on matters of public concern was Dun & Bradstreet,
Ina v. Greenmoss Builders, Ina228 In Dun & Bradstreet, a plurality of
the Court held that Dun & Bradstreet's false statement in a credit
report regarding Greenmoss was a matter of purely private con-
cern. 229 Echoing the majority opinion in Connick, the plurality held
that regarding private figure plaintiffs, matters of private concern do
not implicate the First Amendment.3 0 Again, as in Connick, Dun &
219. Id. at 141.
220. Id.
221. Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752, 760 (E.D. La.), affd, 654 F.2d 719 (5th
Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
222. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983).
223. Id. at 141.
224. See supra part lI.B.4.
225. See Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 860 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1988); supra notes
159-62 and accompanying text.
226. Applying the circular reasoning of Edwards, the memo would have been news-
worthy if the media decided to publish it. See Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y,
556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977); supra note 145 and
accompanying text. Even a neutral report of the accusations, however, would proba-
bly not be privileged as the prominent speaker and public figure elements of the privi-
lege could not likely be proven.
227. Connick, 461 U.S. at 154.
228. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
229. Id. at 762.
230. Id. at 761-62.
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Bradstreet's false credit report would likely be deemed newsworthy
by a court applying the Edwards privilege. There would likely be a
public interest in it at least equal to the public interest in a "small-
town" employer's investigation of suspected drug possession by em-
ployees, deemed newsworthy by the Eighth Circuit in Richmond v.
Southwire Company.231 The false credit statements, however, do not
reach the level of public concern necessary to be afforded constitu-
tional protection from liability for defamation. The category of
speech on matters of public concern is thus clearly more limited than
the category of newsworthiness.
What derives from the above discussion is the need to define more
precisely what are matters of public concern. Generally, the term per-
tains to "what government does or should do and how society is or-
ganized." 3' A more specific and workable definition can be gleaned
only from cases that have applied the standard and scholarly writings
regarding the aims of the First Amendment.
From Connick, one can gain some insight into what constitutes
speech on matters of public concern. Included in Myers's question-
naire was a question whether other employees "felt pressured to work
in political campaigns. 2 33 The Court excepted this question from its
holding that the questionnaire was not speech of public concern.23
Similarly, in discussing what type of speech is of public concern, the
Court in Dun & Bradstreet35 cited cases such as Roth v. United
States236 and Garrison v. Louisiana.2 3 7 The Court cited those cases for
their emphasis on the importance of speech tending to bring about
political change and speech that was the essence of self-government,
respectively.238 Thus, Supreme Court case law indicates that speech
with a political aspect is certainly included in matters of public con-
cern. But the category is broader than simply political speech. Mat-
ters of public concern includes all issues or controversies affecting
persons other than those directly involved in them.239
231. See Richmond v. Southwire Co., 980 F.2d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1992); supra notes
151-53 and accompanying text.
232. Estlund, supra note 213, at 1 n.1.
233. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983).
234. Id. at 149.
235. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
236. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
237. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
238. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759.
239. This definition, which explains the common link between all cases deemed of
public concern, is adapted from the ideas of Professor W. Robert Gray in W. Robert
Gray, Public and Private Speech: Toward a Practice of Pluralistic Convergence in
Free-Speech Values, 1 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 1, 4 (1994). Professor Gray attempts to
distinguish the "public" from the "private" in the free speech context. Id. His goal is
to "utilize a theory of ethical and philosophical pluralism to construct 'the broadest
range of purposes or values that can [meaningfully] be thought to underlie the Free
Speech Clause."' Id. (quoting R. George Wright, A Rationale from J.S. Mill for the
Free Speech Clause, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 149, 149). In formulating his model of "plural-
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In Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 0 the president of a charitable or-
ganization sued a newspaper for libel for an article about the charity's
program to send gift packages to soldiers in the Persian Gulf. The
article accused the charity of drastically marking up the price of the
gift packages before charging contributors."4t The court held that the
paper was constitutionally protected in publishing the article because,
among other reasons, the alleged libel regarded matters of public con-
cern.24z This issue likely reached the level of public concern because it
affected others besides those immediately involved in the dispute2 43
All potential contributors had an interest in whether the charity was
actually marking up the price of the packages significantly.
The Tenth Circuit, in Lee v. Calhoun," affirmed a denial of a claim
of invasion of privacy based on a finding that the plaintiff was a public
figure because of his involvement in a $38 million malpractice suit that
had attracted the media's attention.245 The court explained that the
suit was a matter of public concern because of the public's interest in
the size of monetary damage claims and jury awards.24 As further
support, the court noted the public's interest in "policing failures in
the medical profession."' 47 As was the case in Chapin, many people
other than the litigants in Lee were affected by the controversy.
Silvester v. American Broadcasting Companies24 further supports
this view of matters of public concern. In Silvester, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit held that the public has a legitimate interest in all matters of cor-
ruption, particularly those involving gambling, a highly-regulated
industry. 4 9 The court focused on the effect of the corruption on the
public, noting that the corruption could increase taxpayers'
burdens.250
istic convergence," Gray draws principally from the philosophies of John Dewey,
Hannah Arendt, and Walter Lippmann, relating them to one another vis-4-vis a
scheme devised by Richard P. McKeon. Id. at 42. According to Dewey, there are two
types of activities between people; those affecting only the people directly involved in
the activity and those affecting people outside the activity. John Dewey, The Public
and Its Problems 12-13 (1927). "In this distinction we find the germ of the distinction
between the private and the public." Id. Specifically, when an activity's consequences
are confined primarily to those engaged in the activity, the activity is "private."
When, conversely, the activity produces indirect consequences affecting others, the
activity can be said to be "public."
240. 993 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1993).
241. Id. at 1091.
242. Id. at 1092-93.
243. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
244. 948 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1991).
245. Id. at 1165.
246. Id.
247. Id.; see also Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir.
1981) (recognizing legitimate public interest in competency of licensed professionals).
248. 839 F.2d 1491 (11th Cir. 1988).




Other examples of speech held to be of public concern include:
"[I]f they go for him again, I hope they get him," stated during a dis-
cussion of President Reagan's administration,15' criticism of an expert
witness psychologist's theories and credentials, 25 2 and picketing
against abortion.2 53 The first is political; the latter two certainly affect
the public.
IV. THE PRIVILEGE SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO ONLY SPEECH
ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN
The newsworthiness requirement of the privilege of neutral report-
age must be limited solely to matters of public concern, as the term
has been explained above, for only then will the privilege properly
protect the core First Amendment concerns it seeks to safeguard.
"[I]t is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind ... on all
public institutions." 4 Matters of public concern rest at the heart of
the First Amendment's protection, and discussion of such matters
promotes the values protected by the First Amendment. Matters of
general newsworthiness, as defined by various courts, however, do not
lie at the heart of the First Amendment: Their discussion does not
promote the same values. Thus, the appropriate demarcation be-
tween defamation afforded constitutional protection and defamation
that is not, lies at matters of public concern, not general newsworthi-
ness.2 5 6 Edwards may have nevertheless been decided correctly even
in light of the more limited scope of the privilege proposed by this
Note. The accusations against Professor Edwards were as much a
matter of public concern as the controversies in the cases discussed in
the following subparts, for the same reasons as explained below. The
case, however, sets a dangerous precedent in that many privileged
cases will not truly be deserving of a constitutional privilege. The
term "newsworthy" must be replaced with the phrase "matters of pub-
lic concern," interpreted with an eye towards the aims of the Free
Speech Clause and the type of speech the clause is meant to protect.
This change will guide courts in the future in applying the privilege to
only truly "privileged" cases.
251. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 381, 386-87 (1987).
252. Underwager v. Channel 9 Austl., 69 F.3d 361, 363-64, 366 (9th Cir. 1995).
253. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 476, 479 (1988).
254. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941).
255. First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978).
256. The Florida Circuit Court seems to have limited the privilege in this manner,
although retaining the word "newsworthy." See Clark v. Clark, 21 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 1650, 1654 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1993) (citing Edwards for the proposition that the
privilege of neutral reportage protects "republishing newsworthy information about
matters of public concern").
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A. The Effects of the Proposal
As explained in part III, the category of matters of public concern is
more limited than the category of newsworthiness. Many controver-
sies that will be deemed newsworthy enough by the media to warrant
publication will not be of public concern and deserving of a constitu-
tional privilege. The following hypothetical examples of the privilege
applied in two different cases will illustrate this distinction clearly.
1. Neutral Reportage of Defamatory Matters of Public Concern
Charity solicited members of the public to donate fifty dollars to
send a Care-Pac to United States soldiers abroad. 57 Promotional
materials informed the public that the retail value of the items in a
Care-Pac was forty-nine dollars. Contributor donations had totaled
close to one million Care-Pacs.
During the holiday season, the Defamation Daily published an arti-
cle alleging "hefty mark-ups" of the amount asked for each Care-Pac
as compared to the wholesale value of the items in the Care-Pac. The
article questioned "where the rest of the money [went]." Chain Paper
picked Defamation Daily's story up off of a news wire and republished
it, thereby exposing it nationally. Chain Paper did, however, attribute
the story to Defamation Daily and published Charity's denial of the
accusations. Care-Pac donations dropped precipitously and Charity
lost nearly four million dollars.
Charity sued both Defamation Daily and Chain Paper for defama-
tion. At trial, the evidence showed that the cost to Charity was actu-
ally forty nine dollars per Care-Pac and the extra dollar was used for
other charitable purposes. Defamation Daily and Chain Paper were
found liable for defamation as the evidence further revealed that they
acted with "knowledge of falsity." The appellate court, however, re-
lieved Chain Paper of liability under the privilege of neutral reportage
because the reports were accurate and neutral, the Defamation Daily
was a prominent and responsible organization, Charity was a public
figure, and the story and the charges were both newsworthy and of
legitimate public concern.s
The Second Circuit in Edwards likely envisioned the privilege of
neutral reportage to apply in situations such as the one described.
257. The facts of this hypothetical illustration are adapted from the facts of Chapin
v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1993). They are simplified and altered
for the sake of applying the privilege of neutral reportage. The facts, however, remain
similar enough to the facts of the case so that the Fourth Circuit's holdings that the
president of the charity was a public figure, that the defendant was a member of the
media, and that the charges were of public concern would apply to this hypothetical as
well. See id. at 1092 & nA. The only significant alterations are that: (1) in Chapin the
charges were all either admitted by the plaintiff or opinions of the defendant, and thus
not recoverable; and (2) in Chapin, Knight-Ridder did not attribute the statements to
the Inquirer and thus neutral reportage was not an issue.
258. See supra note 257.
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The public has a strong interest in "the integrity of charities soliciting
funds from the public." 9 Applying the framework for determining
whether a matter is of public concern provided in part III, the contro-
versy surrounding Charity affected others than just Charity and Defa-
mation Daily. All potential contributors were concerned with
whether Charity was mishandling funds. In such a case, the press
should be constitutionally privileged to publish those charges, without
fear of liability should they later prove to be false. Thus, a privilege of
neutral reportage for neutral and accurate reports of charges against
public figures relating to matters of public concern is appropriate.
2. Neutral Reportage of Newsworthy Defamation
Smut Sells, a pornographic magazine, published a scathing personal
attack against Host, a late-night television entertainer, regarding her
anti-pornographic views and activities. 26° The column falsely accused
Host of leading a "wacko group" and "engaging in censorship and
intimidation tactics." The column further referred to Host as "frus-
trated," "threatened by sex," and a "deluded busybody" in need of
"professional help."
Once again, the story was picked up off of a news wire by Chain
Paper. Chain Paper published the story, attributing the charges to
Smut, along with Host's vehement denials. Host sued both Smut Sells
and Chain Paper for defamation. Although Smut was found liable,
Chain Paper escaped liability under the privilege of neutral reportage.
Smut was a prominent organization, Host was a public figure, the
story was an accurate and neutral report of Smut's charges, and the
controversy was newsworthy.
The result in this hypothetical situation is absurd, yet likely, under
Edwards's lenient newsworthiness standard. These baseless accusa-
tions, although newsworthy, add nothing to public debate "around
sensitive issues."' 261 They do not implicate the central theme of the
First Amendment. Thus, they should not be afforded a constitutional
privilege.
B. Reputational Balance
TWo of three recognized rights compete for supremacy in the neu-
tral reportage contexts discussed: The right to reputation, and either
259. Chapin, 993 F.2d at 1092 n.4.
260. This hypothetical is based loosely on the facts of Ault v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 860 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1988). The subject of the attack, however, is changed to a
television host for neutral reportage purposes as television hosts are public figures.
See Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 209-10 (7th Cir. 1976). For convenience,
other facts are changed as well. The similarities to Ault are primarily to ensure that
the controversy and accusations are newsworthy.
261. Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
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the right to publish speech of public concern or the right to publish
newsworthy speech. The proposed limitation of the scope of the privi-
lege of neutral reportage-limiting it to cases of public concern
speech-strikes an appropriate balance between the competing rights.
Among the three rights, the right to publish matters of public con-
cern is of the utmost importance and deserves protection at all costs.
"Public discussions of public issues, together with the spreading of in-
formation and opinion bearing on those issues, must have a freedom
unabridged by our agents"' 26 or by any other rights. Thus, when a
choice must be made between abridging the right to publish public
concern speech on the one hand, and an individual's right to his repu-
tation on the other, the right to publish public concern speech must
prevail. This balancing of interests dictates that the media should be
afforded a constitutional privilege to neutrally and accurately report
charges of public concern, despite the possibility that a reported state-
ment may be false.
Next, however, lies an individual's right to his reputation, not the
right to publish merely newsworthy speech. Thus, the right to a repu-
tation untarnished by defamation must be afforded greater protection
when in conflict with the right to publish speech on matters of purely
private concern. "The First Amendment does not protect a 'freedom
to speak.' It protects the freedom of those activities of thought and
communication by which we 'govern."' 263 And when the activity is
not one of governing, or one at least related to the public and social
change, it must yield to the reputational interest.
Referring to the privilege of neutral reportage, David McCraw, the
Director of Journalism at Marist College, stated:
Any doctrine attempting to extend the media's protection against
libel actions will come at a cost to those whose reputations are in-jured. That can be justified... by showing that the doctrine will
encourage conduct that, on balance, has greater social value than
the reputational protection foregone.... [T]he neutral reportage
privilege [is thus] unacceptable unless an incentive for some other
socially valuable conduct.., is built into the rule.264
Freedom to speak on matters of true public concern is one example of
such independently socially valuable conduct. The public being in-
formed of controversies of "private" concern is not. Thus, while pub-
lishing speech on matters of public concern justifies extending the
media constitutional protection against defamation actions, republish-
ing defamation that is merely newsworthy does not.
262. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 245, 257.
263. Id. at 255.




This Note proposes limiting the scope of the overbroad and ever-
changing privilege of neutral reportage to neutral accounts of matters
of true public concern. This Note also provides a basis for defining
what really is of public concern, concluding that the category includes
controversies affecting others than solely the parties directly involved.
Such a limitation of the privilege is both constitutionally appropriate
and practically beneficial.
Limiting the privilege to speech on matters of public concern will
align the privilege with current Supreme Court defamation law and
with the constitutional protections afforded that category of speech.
Additionally, this proposed privilege strikes an appropriate balance
between the competing rights to free speech and reputation. It does
so by recognizing that speech on matters of public concern has always
been deserving of, and afforded, greater protection than other forms
of speech. Thus, neutrally reporting speech on matters of public con-
cern should be permitted despite a potential harm to the reputation of
a public figure. Mere newsworthy speech, however, which has histori-
cally received less protection than speech of public concern, must
yield when publication would harm a public figure's reputation.
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